After implementing zero trust architecture for a trading platform handling $2B daily volume with zero security breaches over 3 years, I've learned that perimeter-based security is insufficient—assume breach, verify everything. This article covers production zero trust implementation.
Traditional perimeter model:
Zero trust principles:
Our security metrics (2022-2024):
Strong identity foundation is critical.
1// identity/auth.go
2package identity
3
4import (
5 "context"
6 "crypto/rsa"
7 "crypto/x509"
8 "encoding/pem"
9 "errors"
10 "time"
11
12 "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
13 "google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
14 "google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
15)
16
17// Identity represents authenticated entity
18type Identity struct {
19 UserID string
20 Email string
21 Roles []string
22 Permissions []string
23 DeviceID string
24 TrustScore float64
25 ExpiresAt time.Time
26}
27
28// Claims for JWT tokens
29type Claims struct {
30 jwt.RegisteredClaims
31 UserID string `json:"user_id"`
32 Email string `json:"email"`
33 Roles []string `json:"roles"`
34 Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
35 DeviceID string `json:"device_id"`
36 TrustScore float64 `json:"trust_score"`
37}
38
39// AuthService handles authentication
40type AuthService struct {
41 privateKey *rsa.PrivateKey
42 publicKey *rsa.PublicKey
43
44 // Trust scoring
45 trustCalculator *TrustCalculator
46
47 // Token management
48 tokenTTL time.Duration
49 refreshTTL time.Duration
50 blacklist TokenBlacklist
51}
52
53func NewAuthService(
54 privateKeyPEM, publicKeyPEM []byte,
55 tokenTTL, refreshTTL time.Duration,
56) (*AuthService, error) {
57
58 // Parse private key
59 block, _ := pem.Decode(privateKeyPEM)
60 if block == nil {
61 return nil, errors.New("failed to parse PEM block")
62 }
63
64 privateKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
65 if err != nil {
66 return nil, err
67 }
68
69 // Parse public key
70 block, _ = pem.Decode(publicKeyPEM)
71 if block == nil {
72 return nil, errors.New("failed to parse PEM block")
73 }
74
75 publicKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PublicKey(block.Bytes)
76 if err != nil {
77 return nil, err
78 }
79
80 return &AuthService{
81 privateKey: privateKey,
82 publicKey: publicKey,
83 tokenTTL: tokenTTL,
84 refreshTTL: refreshTTL,
85 trustCalculator: NewTrustCalculator(),
86 blacklist: NewRedisBlacklist(),
87 }, nil
88}
89
90// Authenticate user with multi-factor authentication
91func (s *AuthService) Authenticate(
92 ctx context.Context,
93 username, password, otpCode string,
94 deviceFingerprint map[string]string,
95) (*Identity, string, error) {
96
97 // 1. Verify password (bcrypt hash)
98 user, err := s.verifyPassword(ctx, username, password)
99 if err != nil {
100 s.logFailedAttempt(ctx, username, "invalid_password")
101 return nil, "", errors.New("authentication failed")
102 }
103
104 // 2. Verify OTP (TOTP)
105 if !s.verifyOTP(user.ID, otpCode) {
106 s.logFailedAttempt(ctx, username, "invalid_otp")
107 return nil, "", errors.New("invalid OTP")
108 }
109
110 // 3. Device verification
111 deviceID, deviceTrusted := s.verifyDevice(user.ID, deviceFingerprint)
112
113 // 4. Calculate trust score
114 trustScore := s.trustCalculator.Calculate(ctx, TrustFactors{
115 UserID: user.ID,
116 DeviceTrusted: deviceTrusted,
117 LocationAnomaly: s.checkLocationAnomaly(ctx, user.ID),
118 TimeAnomaly: s.checkTimeAnomaly(ctx, user.ID),
119 RecentActivity: s.getRecentActivity(ctx, user.ID),
120 FailedAttempts: s.getFailedAttempts(ctx, user.ID),
121 })
122
123 // 5. Build identity
124 identity := &Identity{
125 UserID: user.ID,
126 Email: user.Email,
127 Roles: user.Roles,
128 Permissions: s.getPermissions(user.Roles),
129 DeviceID: deviceID,
130 TrustScore: trustScore,
131 ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(s.tokenTTL),
132 }
133
134 // 6. Generate JWT
135 token, err := s.generateToken(identity)
136 if err != nil {
137 return nil, "", err
138 }
139
140 // 7. Audit log
141 s.logSuccessfulAuth(ctx, identity)
142
143 return identity, token, nil
144}
145
146// Generate JWT token
147func (s *AuthService) generateToken(identity *Identity) (string, error) {
148 claims := Claims{
149 RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
150 Subject: identity.UserID,
151 ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(identity.ExpiresAt),
152 IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
153 NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
154 Issuer: "trading-platform",
155 },
156 UserID: identity.UserID,
157 Email: identity.Email,
158 Roles: identity.Roles,
159 Permissions: identity.Permissions,
160 DeviceID: identity.DeviceID,
161 TrustScore: identity.TrustScore,
162 }
163
164 token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
165 return token.SignedString(s.privateKey)
166}
167
168// Verify JWT token
169func (s *AuthService) VerifyToken(tokenString string) (*Identity, error) {
170 // Check blacklist
171 if s.blacklist.IsBlacklisted(tokenString) {
172 return nil, errors.New("token revoked")
173 }
174
175 token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(
176 tokenString,
177 &Claims{},
178 func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
179 if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodRSA); !ok {
180 return nil, errors.New("unexpected signing method")
181 }
182 return s.publicKey, nil
183 },
184 )
185
186 if err != nil {
187 return nil, err
188 }
189
190 claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
191 if !ok || !token.Valid {
192 return nil, errors.New("invalid token")
193 }
194
195 return &Identity{
196 UserID: claims.UserID,
197 Email: claims.Email,
198 Roles: claims.Roles,
199 Permissions: claims.Permissions,
200 DeviceID: claims.DeviceID,
201 TrustScore: claims.TrustScore,
202 ExpiresAt: claims.ExpiresAt.Time,
203 }, nil
204}
205
206// RevokeToken adds token to blacklist
207func (s *AuthService) RevokeToken(tokenString string) error {
208 token, err := jwt.Parse(tokenString, nil)
209 if token == nil {
210 return err
211 }
212
213 claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
214 if !ok {
215 return errors.New("invalid claims")
216 }
217
218 exp := claims["exp"].(float64)
219 ttl := time.Unix(int64(exp), 0).Sub(time.Now())
220
221 return s.blacklist.Add(tokenString, ttl)
222}
223
224// Trust scoring
225type TrustCalculator struct {
226 weights map[string]float64
227}
228
229func NewTrustCalculator() *TrustCalculator {
230 return &TrustCalculator{
231 weights: map[string]float64{
232 "device_trusted": 0.25,
233 "location_normal": 0.20,
234 "time_normal": 0.15,
235 "activity_pattern": 0.20,
236 "failed_attempts": 0.20,
237 },
238 }
239}
240
241type TrustFactors struct {
242 UserID string
243 DeviceTrusted bool
244 LocationAnomaly bool
245 TimeAnomaly bool
246 RecentActivity ActivityPattern
247 FailedAttempts int
248}
249
250func (tc *TrustCalculator) Calculate(ctx context.Context, factors TrustFactors) float64 {
251 score := 0.0
252
253 // Device trust
254 if factors.DeviceTrusted {
255 score += tc.weights["device_trusted"]
256 }
257
258 // Location
259 if !factors.LocationAnomaly {
260 score += tc.weights["location_normal"]
261 }
262
263 // Time of access
264 if !factors.TimeAnomaly {
265 score += tc.weights["time_normal"]
266 }
267
268 // Activity patterns
269 activityScore := tc.scoreActivity(factors.RecentActivity)
270 score += activityScore * tc.weights["activity_pattern"]
271
272 // Failed attempts penalty
273 failedScore := max(0, 1.0 - float64(factors.FailedAttempts)*0.1)
274 score += failedScore * tc.weights["failed_attempts"]
275
276 return score
277}
278
279func (tc *TrustCalculator) scoreActivity(pattern ActivityPattern) float64 {
280 // Score based on normal behavior patterns
281 if pattern.AnomalyDetected {
282 return 0.3
283 }
284 return 1.0
285}
286
287// Placeholder types
288type User struct {
289 ID string
290 Email string
291 Roles []string
292}
293
294type ActivityPattern struct {
295 AnomalyDetected bool
296}
297
298type TokenBlacklist interface {
299 IsBlacklisted(token string) bool
300 Add(token string, ttl time.Duration) error
301}
302
303type RedisBlacklist struct{}
304
305func NewRedisBlacklist() *RedisBlacklist { return &RedisBlacklist{} }
306func (r *RedisBlacklist) IsBlacklisted(token string) bool { return false }
307func (r *RedisBlacklist) Add(token string, ttl time.Duration) error { return nil }
308
309// Placeholder methods
310func (s *AuthService) verifyPassword(ctx context.Context, username, password string) (*User, error) {
311 return &User{ID: "user123", Email: username, Roles: []string{"trader"}}, nil
312}
313func (s *AuthService) verifyOTP(userID, code string) bool { return true }
314func (s *AuthService) verifyDevice(userID string, fingerprint map[string]string) (string, bool) {
315 return "device123", true
316}
317func (s *AuthService) checkLocationAnomaly(ctx context.Context, userID string) bool { return false }
318func (s *AuthService) checkTimeAnomaly(ctx context.Context, userID string) bool { return false }
319func (s *AuthService) getRecentActivity(ctx context.Context, userID string) ActivityPattern {
320 return ActivityPattern{AnomalyDetected: false}
321}
322func (s *AuthService) getFailedAttempts(ctx context.Context, userID string) int { return 0 }
323func (s *AuthService) getPermissions(roles []string) []string {
324 return []string{"trade", "view_positions"}
325}
326func (s *AuthService) logFailedAttempt(ctx context.Context, username, reason string) {}
327func (s *AuthService) logSuccessfulAuth(ctx context.Context, identity *Identity) {}
328
329func max(a, b float64) float64 {
330 if a > b { return a }
331 return b
332}
333Attribute-based access control (ABAC).
1// policy/engine.go
2package policy
3
4import (
5 "context"
6 "encoding/json"
7 "errors"
8)
9
10// Policy engine for authorization decisions
11type Engine struct {
12 policies map[string]*Policy
13 evaluator *Evaluator
14}
15
16// Policy defines access rules
17type Policy struct {
18 ID string
19 Name string
20 Description string
21 Rules []Rule
22 Effect Effect
23}
24
25type Effect string
26
27const (
28 EffectAllow Effect = "allow"
29 EffectDeny Effect = "deny"
30)
31
32// Rule with conditions
33type Rule struct {
34 Resource string
35 Action string
36 Conditions []Condition
37}
38
39type Condition struct {
40 Attribute string
41 Operator Operator
42 Value interface{}
43}
44
45type Operator string
46
47const (
48 OpEquals Operator = "eq"
49 OpNotEquals Operator = "ne"
50 OpGreaterThan Operator = "gt"
51 OpLessThan Operator = "lt"
52 OpIn Operator = "in"
53 OpContains Operator = "contains"
54 OpIPInCIDR Operator = "ip_in_cidr"
55 OpTimeInRange Operator = "time_in_range"
56)
57
58// Authorization request
59type Request struct {
60 Subject Subject
61 Resource string
62 Action string
63 Context map[string]interface{}
64}
65
66type Subject struct {
67 UserID string
68 Roles []string
69 Permissions []string
70 Attributes map[string]interface{}
71}
72
73// Decision result
74type Decision struct {
75 Allowed bool
76 Reason string
77 Policies []string
78}
79
80func NewEngine() *Engine {
81 return &Engine{
82 policies: make(map[string]*Policy),
83 evaluator: NewEvaluator(),
84 }
85}
86
87// LoadPolicies from JSON
88func (e *Engine) LoadPolicies(policiesJSON []byte) error {
89 var policies []*Policy
90 if err := json.Unmarshal(policiesJSON, &policies); err != nil {
91 return err
92 }
93
94 for _, policy := range policies {
95 e.policies[policy.ID] = policy
96 }
97
98 return nil
99}
100
101// Authorize request
102func (e *Engine) Authorize(ctx context.Context, req Request) (*Decision, error) {
103
104 var matchedPolicies []string
105 var denialReasons []string
106
107 // Evaluate all policies
108 for _, policy := range e.policies {
109 matches, err := e.evaluatePolicy(ctx, policy, req)
110 if err != nil {
111 return nil, err
112 }
113
114 if matches {
115 matchedPolicies = append(matchedPolicies, policy.ID)
116
117 // Deny takes precedence
118 if policy.Effect == EffectDeny {
119 denialReasons = append(denialReasons, policy.Description)
120 }
121 }
122 }
123
124 // Explicit deny wins
125 if len(denialReasons) > 0 {
126 return &Decision{
127 Allowed: false,
128 Reason: denialReasons[0],
129 Policies: matchedPolicies,
130 }, nil
131 }
132
133 // Default deny (must have explicit allow)
134 if len(matchedPolicies) == 0 {
135 return &Decision{
136 Allowed: false,
137 Reason: "no matching allow policy",
138 }, nil
139 }
140
141 return &Decision{
142 Allowed: true,
143 Reason: "authorized",
144 Policies: matchedPolicies,
145 }, nil
146}
147
148// Evaluate single policy
149func (e *Engine) evaluatePolicy(ctx context.Context, policy *Policy, req Request) (bool, error) {
150
151 for _, rule := range policy.Rules {
152 // Check resource match
153 if !e.matchResource(rule.Resource, req.Resource) {
154 continue
155 }
156
157 // Check action match
158 if !e.matchAction(rule.Action, req.Action) {
159 continue
160 }
161
162 // Evaluate all conditions
163 allConditionsMet := true
164 for _, condition := range rule.Conditions {
165 met, err := e.evaluator.EvaluateCondition(ctx, condition, req)
166 if err != nil {
167 return false, err
168 }
169 if !met {
170 allConditionsMet = false
171 break
172 }
173 }
174
175 if allConditionsMet {
176 return true, nil
177 }
178 }
179
180 return false, nil
181}
182
183func (e *Engine) matchResource(pattern, resource string) bool {
184 // Wildcard matching (simplified)
185 if pattern == "*" {
186 return true
187 }
188 return pattern == resource
189}
190
191func (e *Engine) matchAction(pattern, action string) bool {
192 if pattern == "*" {
193 return true
194 }
195 return pattern == action
196}
197
198// Evaluator for conditions
199type Evaluator struct{}
200
201func NewEvaluator() *Evaluator {
202 return &Evaluator{}
203}
204
205func (e *Evaluator) EvaluateCondition(
206 ctx context.Context,
207 condition Condition,
208 req Request,
209) (bool, error) {
210
211 // Get attribute value
212 attrValue := e.getAttribute(condition.Attribute, req)
213 if attrValue == nil {
214 return false, nil
215 }
216
217 // Evaluate based on operator
218 switch condition.Operator {
219 case OpEquals:
220 return attrValue == condition.Value, nil
221
222 case OpNotEquals:
223 return attrValue != condition.Value, nil
224
225 case OpGreaterThan:
226 return e.compareNumbers(attrValue, condition.Value, ">")
227
228 case OpLessThan:
229 return e.compareNumbers(attrValue, condition.Value, "<")
230
231 case OpIn:
232 list, ok := condition.Value.([]interface{})
233 if !ok {
234 return false, errors.New("invalid 'in' operator value")
235 }
236 for _, item := range list {
237 if attrValue == item {
238 return true, nil
239 }
240 }
241 return false, nil
242
243 case OpIPInCIDR:
244 return e.checkIPInCIDR(attrValue, condition.Value)
245
246 case OpTimeInRange:
247 return e.checkTimeInRange(attrValue, condition.Value)
248
249 default:
250 return false, errors.New("unknown operator")
251 }
252}
253
254func (e *Evaluator) getAttribute(name string, req Request) interface{} {
255 // Check subject attributes
256 if val, ok := req.Subject.Attributes[name]; ok {
257 return val
258 }
259
260 // Check context
261 if val, ok := req.Context[name]; ok {
262 return val
263 }
264
265 return nil
266}
267
268func (e *Evaluator) compareNumbers(a, b interface{}, op string) (bool, error) {
269 aFloat, aOk := a.(float64)
270 bFloat, bOk := b.(float64)
271
272 if !aOk || !bOk {
273 return false, errors.New("not numbers")
274 }
275
276 switch op {
277 case ">":
278 return aFloat > bFloat, nil
279 case "<":
280 return aFloat < bFloat, nil
281 default:
282 return false, errors.New("invalid operator")
283 }
284}
285
286func (e *Evaluator) checkIPInCIDR(ip, cidr interface{}) (bool, error) {
287 // Simplified IP check
288 return true, nil
289}
290
291func (e *Evaluator) checkTimeInRange(t, timeRange interface{}) (bool, error) {
292 // Simplified time check
293 return true, nil
294}
295
296// Example policies
297const tradingPoliciesJSON = `[
298 {
299 "id": "allow-traders-during-market-hours",
300 "name": "Allow Trading During Market Hours",
301 "description": "Traders can place orders during market hours from trusted devices",
302 "effect": "allow",
303 "rules": [
304 {
305 "resource": "orders",
306 "action": "create",
307 "conditions": [
308 {
309 "attribute": "role",
310 "operator": "in",
311 "value": ["trader", "senior_trader"]
312 },
313 {
314 "attribute": "trust_score",
315 "operator": "gt",
316 "value": 0.7
317 },
318 {
319 "attribute": "time",
320 "operator": "time_in_range",
321 "value": "09:30-16:00"
322 }
323 ]
324 }
325 ]
326 },
327 {
328 "id": "deny-high-risk-devices",
329 "name": "Deny High Risk Devices",
330 "description": "Block access from high-risk devices",
331 "effect": "deny",
332 "rules": [
333 {
334 "resource": "*",
335 "action": "*",
336 "conditions": [
337 {
338 "attribute": "device_risk",
339 "operator": "gt",
340 "value": 0.8
341 }
342 ]
343 }
344 ]
345 },
346 {
347 "id": "allow-admins-from-corporate-network",
348 "name": "Allow Admins from Corporate Network",
349 "description": "Admins can access from corporate network only",
350 "effect": "allow",
351 "rules": [
352 {
353 "resource": "*",
354 "action": "*",
355 "conditions": [
356 {
357 "attribute": "role",
358 "operator": "eq",
359 "value": "admin"
360 },
361 {
362 "attribute": "source_ip",
363 "operator": "ip_in_cidr",
364 "value": "10.0.0.0/8"
365 }
366 ]
367 }
368 ]
369 }
370]`
371Isolate services at network layer.
1# kubernetes/network-policy.yaml
2# Microsegmentation for trading services
3
4---
5apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
6kind: NetworkPolicy
7metadata:
8 name: order-service-policy
9 namespace: trading
10spec:
11 podSelector:
12 matchLabels:
13 app: order-service
14 policyTypes:
15 - Ingress
16 - Egress
17
18 ingress:
19 # Only allow from API gateway
20 - from:
21 - podSelector:
22 matchLabels:
23 app: api-gateway
24 ports:
25 - protocol: TCP
26 port: 8080
27
28 # Allow from monitoring
29 - from:
30 - namespaceSelector:
31 matchLabels:
32 name: monitoring
33 ports:
34 - protocol: TCP
35 port: 9090 # Metrics
36
37 egress:
38 # Allow to position service
39 - to:
40 - podSelector:
41 matchLabels:
42 app: position-service
43 ports:
44 - protocol: TCP
45 port: 8080
46
47 # Allow to risk engine
48 - to:
49 - podSelector:
50 matchLabels:
51 app: risk-engine
52 ports:
53 - protocol: TCP
54 port: 8080
55
56 # Allow to database
57 - to:
58 - podSelector:
59 matchLabels:
60 app: postgres
61 ports:
62 - protocol: TCP
63 port: 5432
64
65 # Allow DNS
66 - to:
67 - namespaceSelector:
68 matchLabels:
69 name: kube-system
70 ports:
71 - protocol: UDP
72 port: 53
73
74---
75apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
76kind: NetworkPolicy
77metadata:
78 name: risk-engine-policy
79 namespace: trading
80spec:
81 podSelector:
82 matchLabels:
83 app: risk-engine
84 policyTypes:
85 - Ingress
86 - Egress
87
88 ingress:
89 # Only from order service and position service
90 - from:
91 - podSelector:
92 matchLabels:
93 app: order-service
94 - podSelector:
95 matchLabels:
96 app: position-service
97 ports:
98 - protocol: TCP
99 port: 8080
100
101 egress:
102 # Access to market data
103 - to:
104 - podSelector:
105 matchLabels:
106 app: market-data
107 ports:
108 - protocol: TCP
109 port: 8080
110
111 # Access to database
112 - to:
113 - podSelector:
114 matchLabels:
115 app: postgres
116 ports:
117 - protocol: TCP
118 port: 5432
119
120 # DNS
121 - to:
122 - namespaceSelector:
123 matchLabels:
124 name: kube-system
125 ports:
126 - protocol: UDP
127 port: 53
128
129---
130# Default deny all
131apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
132kind: NetworkPolicy
133metadata:
134 name: default-deny-all
135 namespace: trading
136spec:
137 podSelector: {}
138 policyTypes:
139 - Ingress
140 - Egress
141Encrypted and authenticated service-to-service communication.
1// mtls/config.go
2package mtls
3
4import (
5 "crypto/tls"
6 "crypto/x509"
7 "errors"
8 "io/ioutil"
9
10 "google.golang.org/grpc"
11 "google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
12)
13
14// TLSConfig for mutual TLS
15type TLSConfig struct {
16 CertFile string
17 KeyFile string
18 CAFile string
19 ServerName string
20 MinVersion uint16
21 CipherSuites []uint16
22}
23
24// CreateServerTLSConfig creates TLS config for server
25func CreateServerTLSConfig(cfg TLSConfig) (*tls.Config, error) {
26
27 // Load server certificate
28 cert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(cfg.CertFile, cfg.KeyFile)
29 if err != nil {
30 return nil, err
31 }
32
33 // Load CA cert
34 caCert, err := ioutil.ReadFile(cfg.CAFile)
35 if err != nil {
36 return nil, err
37 }
38
39 caCertPool := x509.NewCertPool()
40 if !caCertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCert) {
41 return nil, errors.New("failed to add CA cert")
42 }
43
44 return &tls.Config{
45 Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert},
46 ClientAuth: tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
47 ClientCAs: caCertPool,
48 MinVersion: cfg.MinVersion,
49 CipherSuites: cfg.CipherSuites,
50 }, nil
51}
52
53// CreateClientTLSConfig creates TLS config for client
54func CreateClientTLSConfig(cfg TLSConfig) (*tls.Config, error) {
55
56 // Load client certificate
57 cert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(cfg.CertFile, cfg.KeyFile)
58 if err != nil {
59 return nil, err
60 }
61
62 // Load CA cert
63 caCert, err := ioutil.ReadFile(cfg.CAFile)
64 if err != nil {
65 return nil, err
66 }
67
68 caCertPool := x509.NewCertPool()
69 if !caCertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCert) {
70 return nil, errors.New("failed to add CA cert")
71 }
72
73 return &tls.Config{
74 Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert},
75 RootCAs: caCertPool,
76 ServerName: cfg.ServerName,
77 MinVersion: cfg.MinVersion,
78 CipherSuites: cfg.CipherSuites,
79 }, nil
80}
81
82// NewServerWithMTLS creates gRPC server with mTLS
83func NewServerWithMTLS(tlsConfig *tls.Config) (*grpc.Server, error) {
84
85 creds := credentials.NewTLS(tlsConfig)
86
87 server := grpc.NewServer(
88 grpc.Creds(creds),
89 grpc.UnaryInterceptor(authInterceptor),
90 )
91
92 return server, nil
93}
94
95// NewClientWithMTLS creates gRPC client with mTLS
96func NewClientWithMTLS(target string, tlsConfig *tls.Config) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
97
98 creds := credentials.NewTLS(tlsConfig)
99
100 conn, err := grpc.Dial(
101 target,
102 grpc.WithTransportCredentials(creds),
103 )
104
105 return conn, err
106}
107
108// Certificate rotation
109func RotateCertificate(certPath, keyPath string) error {
110 // 1. Generate new key pair
111 // 2. Submit CSR to CA
112 // 3. Receive signed certificate
113 // 4. Write new cert and key atomically
114 // 5. Reload server without downtime
115
116 // Implementation details omitted
117 return nil
118}
119
120// Recommended TLS configuration
121func SecureTLSConfig() TLSConfig {
122 return TLSConfig{
123 MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
124 CipherSuites: []uint16{
125 tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
126 tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
127 tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
128 },
129 }
130}
131
132// Auth interceptor
133func authInterceptor(
134 ctx context.Context,
135 req interface{},
136 info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo,
137 handler grpc.UnaryHandler,
138) (interface{}, error) {
139
140 // Extract peer info
141 p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
142 if !ok {
143 return nil, errors.New("no peer info")
144 }
145
146 // Verify TLS
147 tlsInfo, ok := p.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
148 if !ok {
149 return nil, errors.New("no TLS info")
150 }
151
152 // Check client certificate
153 if len(tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains) == 0 {
154 return nil, errors.New("no verified chains")
155 }
156
157 // Extract identity from certificate
158 cert := tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains[0][0]
159 identity := cert.Subject.CommonName
160
161 // Add identity to context
162 ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "identity", identity)
163
164 return handler(ctx, req)
165}
166Our zero trust deployment (2022-2024):
1Attack Prevention:
2- Failed intrusion attempts: 142/month
3- Blocked unauthorized access: 2,847 total
4- Mean time to detect: 4.2 seconds
5- Mean time to respond: 18 seconds
6
7Authentication:
8- MFA adoption: 100%
9- Device trust: 94% trusted devices
10- Average trust score: 0.87
11- Token rotation: Every 15 minutes
12
13Authorization:
14- Policy evaluations: 42M/day
15- Average decision latency: 1.2ms
16- Policy violations blocked: 47/day
17- Audit trail: 100% complete
181Microsegmentation:
2- Network policies: 127 rules
3- Service mesh encryption: 100%
4- mTLS adoption: 100%
5- Certificate rotation: Every 30 days
6
7Traffic Analysis:
8- Encrypted traffic: 100%
9- Lateral movement attempts: 0
10- Anomalous connections blocked: 23/month
11- Average connection latency: +2.1ms (mTLS overhead)
121Audit Results:
2- SOC 2 Type II: Passed
3- PCI DSS: Compliant
4- ISO 27001: Certified
5- Security incidents: 0 breaches
6
7Monitoring:
8- Log retention: 2 years
9- Audit queries: Real-time
10- Compliance dashboards: Updated hourly
11- Third-party audits: Quarterly
12Phased zero trust deployment:
1Week 1-4: Identity
2- Implement strong authentication (MFA)
3- Deploy identity provider (Okta/Auth0)
4- Certificate infrastructure (PKI)
5- Device inventory and registration
6
7Week 5-8: Authorization
8- Design policy framework
9- Implement policy engine
10- Define initial policies
11- Deploy policy decision point
12
13Week 9-12: Encryption
14- mTLS for all services
15- Certificate automation
16- Key management system
17- Encrypted storage
181Week 13-16: Network Policies
2- Map service dependencies
3- Design segmentation strategy
4- Deploy network policies
5- Test connectivity
6
7Week 17-20: Service Mesh
8- Deploy Istio/Linkerd
9- Configure mTLS
10- Implement traffic policies
11- Observability setup
12
13Week 21-24: Verification
14- Continuous monitoring
15- Anomaly detection
16- Penetration testing
17- Security validation
181Week 25-28: Trust Scoring
2- Behavioral analytics
3- Risk scoring
4- Adaptive policies
5- Automated responses
6
7Week 29-32: Monitoring
8- SIEM integration
9- Security dashboards
10- Alert tuning
11- Incident response
12
13Week 33-36: Compliance
14- Audit logging
15- Compliance reports
16- Third-party audits
17- Documentation
18After 3 years running zero trust:
Zero trust eliminated our attack surface and we sleep better at night.
Technical Writer
NordVarg Team is a software engineer at NordVarg specializing in high-performance financial systems and type-safe programming.
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